

The Worried Global Public: Moral Authority In Times Of Peril

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Abstract

In the worst economic crisis in five decades, the massive growth of jobless people raises basic questions about the future of the global economy and what we can do about it. The recovery is going to be very slow and the danger of a relapse is all too real.

Global governance needs better co-ordination and effective co-operation, but at this point in time, when there is such institutional disequilibria and unprecedented economic chaos due to drops in production and trade, the animal spirits of a laissez-faire age are too big to conquer.

It is evident that we don't know when this global recession will end and which economists, if any, speak with moral authority with the Hayekian world of price theory collapsed in the face of impossibly distressed financial markets and bankers' reckless greed. The structural crisis has challenged the authority of the political class and the state has had to step in to remedy the failure of the market.

Nouriel Roubini, the master of the forecast business, is now calling for a double V in the US where consumer demand remains weak and very cautious. Prospects for the Eurozone remain dodgy at best because the road to recovery has to run through the battered labour markets with millions of unemployed.

So far the animal spirits of capitalism are not driving the recovery. Instead it is the logic and calculus of governments that are on the front foot as they spend trillions to bail out the private sector and create the effective demand needed to restart the engine of capital accumulation.

From Global Bad to Worse

In the worst economic crisis in five decades, the massive growth of jobless people raises basic questions about the future of the global economy and what we can do about it. The recovery is going to be very slow and the danger of a relapse is all too real. Even if the worst of the crisis seems to be passing as the OECD noted in its latest *Economic Outlook*,¹ the financial system that imploded little less than a year ago is weighted down with toxic assets, and the deleveraging has barely begun. In a post bubble world, the recovery is not going to feel like one for quite some time.

The current economic mess has taken a hammer to exports that have fallen precipitously in leading economies such as Japan by 20 percent along with Korea, Germany, the US and China in similar magnitudes. The US economy alone hemorrhaged 600,000 jobs monthly up until the end of 2008 and has shed over 12 million from its manufacturing sector since the crisis began in late 2007. Central to this story is the disappearance of the high-spending consumer particularly in the US.² The weakness of exports in the leading economies of the globe added to weak consumer spending remains a serious drag on an early recovery and end to the jobs crisis.

Global governance needs better co-ordination and effective co-operation, but at this point in time, when there is such institutional disequilibria and unprecedented economic chaos due to drops in production and trade, the animal spirits of a laissez-faire age are too big to conquer.³ Industrial production in 16 countries on the *Financial Times* weather map was 20 percent lower in March 2009 than the same period in 2008 – the sharpest drop since the end of World War II.⁴ The Mexican economy, once highly touted as the model for Latin America contracted 10 percent by September 2009 and further shrinkage of the economy is predicted for the next year. The explanation for all this misery and chaos is that the contraction of production, consumption, trade and employment has created a deadly

perfect international storm. Even China and India, the bright spots of growth in the troubled world economy, have seen their economies shrink and over twenty five million people have lost their employment.

A V Shaped Recovery?

It is evident that we don't know when this global recession will end and which economists, if any, speak with moral authority with the Hayekian world of price theory collapsed in the face of impossibly distressed financial markets and bankers' reckless greed. The structural crisis has challenged the authority of the political class and the state has had to step in to remedy the failure of the market. The optimistic 'green shoots' scenario popularized by Ben Bernanke, head of the US Reserve Bank, may indeed be present in some financial markets and some banks but the evidence is that labour markets lag behind financial markets by a year or more. Many economists are counting on a high unemployment scenario well into 2012.⁵

Still it is not inconceivable that the Eurozone will experience an early return to growth after the entire region was rocked by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in late 2008. Some economists believe a V shaped recovery will occur as the result of a combination of companies having to replenish their exhausted inventories, the fiscal stimulus provided by governments pumping billions into the economy and the new regulatory rules designed to bring probity to unregulated financial institutions such as derivative trading and near banks. The V is likely to be sketchy so long as the demand for German exports is modest for the near future. Nouriel Roubini, the master of the forecast business, is now calling for a double V in the US where consumer demand remains weak and very cautious.⁶ Prospects for the Eurozone remain dodgy at best because the road to recovery has to run through the battered labour markets with millions of unemployed.

Stiglitz got it right when he wrote recently that “ the world economy will go through a long recession and a very deep depression” before there is a return to global health.⁷ The global North and South are living through a free fall of their economies, and it is not going to come to an end with the same neo-liberal laissez-faire ideology that allowed the deregulation of financial markets to happen in the first place. As the public policy framework of governments worldwide, market fundamentalism is largely discredited. Gordon Brown, a recent convert to the idea, stated boldly at the March G20 meeting that the Washington Consensus, the fountain head of market fundamental economics, is dead. Indeed market fundamentalism may still be ‘the beacon on the hill’ in the minds of some orthodox economists but its day is over as the unassailable gold standard of public policy. Akerlof’s and Schiller’s trenchant analysis that ‘animal spirits’ are closer to being muzzled and channeled by regulatory authority, particularly in Europe, is not off the mark where bankers’ bonuses are to be capped.⁸ Few find credible the proposition that the world economies are leading the way to a new era of capitalist glory. So far the animal spirits of capitalism are not driving the recovery. Instead it is the logic and calculus of governments that are on the front foot as they spend trillions to bail out the private sector and create the effective demand needed to restart the engine of capital accumulation.


The Future of High Security Social Europe

The question is where is social Europe and the worried public -- those afflicted by the economic turmoil at this time of complex institutional change? A great deal of research documents that an acute structural crisis is caused by the mismatch and breakdown between the process of accumulation and the framework of public regulation. The global economy still has not found its new equilibrium point between the citizen, the state and the market. For a really healthy economy, it is not sustainable to have finance as large as it is today. In the US, finance accounted for 40 percent of total profits in 2008, and Simon Johnson strongly argues that consumers and other sectors are being ‘severely squeezed’ by

banks and other financial institutions ability to extract such huge unregulated rents.⁹ The pervasiveness of investor uncertainty has not been an incentive for a fundamental recasting of economic relations.

Pessimists argue that social Europe is on the firing line and likely to be smaller and less important post-recovery. Expert studies remind us that the social market inevitably expands in times of economic crisis. State spending between 1980 and 2005, a proxy for the social market among other things, was a robust 51% of GDP in France, 49% in Italy, 46% in Germany. Blair's second term raised UK spending to continental socio-democratic levels from 39 percent to 44 % -- just 2 points lower than Germany's. The hollowing out of the state is a story that is not supported empirically. By contrast, the race to the bottom took place in the US. Under Clinton, state spending declined to 36 %, a figure bloated by US military spending. (See figure for state and health spending for 2008)

Figure One



Source: *Economist* May 7, 2009.

Euroskeptics argue that social Europe has taken a battering, but even if it retracts, recedes and is downsized in some jurisdictions, it remains an integral part of the Eurozone's institutional framework.¹⁰ It is functional and the automatic stabilizers of public and mixed goods provide the macro-stimulus and money for people to spend in good times as well as bad. The social market has been called, for good reason, the 'stepchild' of European integration.¹¹ The deal, nurtured and expanded over seventy years, is that integration could not proceed without a social market for consumer protection, ecology, equal opportunities, health and industrial safety. Industrial democracy, human rights and rights for women have deepened the institutional side of social Europe. Entitlement-based rights have exploded and these stabilizers operate exactly the way Keynes predicted as a gigantic multiplier effect that boosts consumer spending and business investment in dire times.

With Germany as the anchor for this system of entitlements and protection, the Eurozone's market for non-negotiable goods covers over 250 million people from the Scandinavian northern sea, Netherlands, Austria and Belgium to the core Mediterranean members including France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. In all it represents European social democratic values with respect to employment practices, labour standards, precarious work, citizenship practices and gender rights. The regulatory economic mix is so large that it is difficult to get an exact take on its many entitlements and socio-economic protections. What is not in doubt is that it is too big and important to the Eurozone to downsize it significantly. It can be trimmed back and fine-tuned but not structurally cut down to suit neo-liberal fanatasies.

In the current economic mess, Europeans inside the gold handcuffs of the social market are in an enviable position. Streeck and the neo functionalists have been proven wrong that Europe's high wage, high tax regime was too costly to maintain.¹² In the race to globalize, Europeans have been persuaded that it is always better to have benefits though no job than no benefits and no job, the reality that millions of Americans are confronting.

Secondly, the social market is part of an institutionalized network of publically-funded health wellness based on the principal of universality. Tens of millions of EU citizens receive health protection not from the EU but from their own country's universal health care system. The social market model of health care bears no resemblance to the US for-profit HMO model that now excludes over 60 million Americans from coverage. The *Economist* recently featured an article about why the French model looks pretty good to Anglo-American eyes, and here is what it found:

“Beauvais, the administrative capital [in Picardy] , captures the cushioning effect of the French model in recession, and its strong egalitarian ethos. On the one hand, there is widespread fear of job losses. On the other, there is a sense that the economy is propped up even in bad times by the public sector and the welfare system. Fully 43% of the town's residents live in rent-subsidised social housing. The town hall itself is a big employer. Some 130 gardeners, for example, toil away in its flowerbeds year-round, digging, weeding and planting. It also distributes all manner of direct help to families, such as vouchers for children's holidays or after-school activities. It has devised a special scheme for the 4,500 “working poor”, who fall outside other national welfare safety-nets.”¹³

Given all that has transpired in the last 12 months, finance has become too big relative to the rest of the economy. The Eurozone has proven that it is possible to be skeptical about the self regulating market even when Euro banks are in worse shape than their US counterparts.

Moral authority and dissent

The picture of complex institutional change needs closer examination if we are to focus on the right story about the

persistent importance of varieties of capitalism and why global publics are on full alert against the worship of the self-regulating market. Indeed new perspectives are needed to free us from the 'hazardous obsession' with global integration, to employ Dani Rodrik's phrase of choice.¹⁴

Not so long ago, the status quo used to be that governments prided themselves on their role as unifiers not dividers and their ability to speak for the nation, the national interest, and the good of the world in general. The Right has found that new technologies have expanded the possibility for identity and provided new opportunities to spread the conformist message. Nevertheless, the way that new technologies have given voice to formerly marginalized, toxic e-extremists has been counterproductive for many of the neo-conservative conformist movements trying to create mainstream cachet. After all, the conformist agenda has increasingly become a protest movement, much like that of dissent, but a movement in the strange position of being a disloyal opposition. The hardline neo-conservative conformists are caught between the dissent movement and mainstream public policy. Even governments recognize that the status quo is no longer good enough. Their collective influence of rigid faith-based politics is being leached away to the centre Right – to the undecideds and waverers who are disillusioned by the war in Iraq, the perils of climate warming, and US-sanctioned torture. They have lost much ground to the growing effectiveness of the social movements on the compass of dissent.¹⁵

Compared to a decade ago, the neo-liberal culture of conformity is increasingly embattled and on the defensive across the globe. Sharp disagreements between professional economists now frame much of our thinking about the global crisis. Why do professional economists disagree on so many fundamental issues? Dani Rodrik gives a compelling answer.¹⁶

The first group of economists like Gary Becker, Tyler Cowen, Greg Mankiw, and Brad De Long, he notes, can be called first-best economists. They believe that market imperfections are

always part of the system and the market outcomes can only be improved when markets are unfettered. These first-best economists, consider the market and all of its participants to be rational actors who function smoothly and should be left to their own devices in order to achieve maximum efficiency. They ignore real world complications. There is second group of professional economists and in it he places the likes of Joe Stiglitz, Paul Krugman, George Akerlof, Robert Schiller and himself who want to find answers to market intervention and the real world complications that mainstream economics with their abstract models ignore. People don't behave rationally and they over-discount the future. For this group of practionners, well-designed interventions can improve market outcomes with co-operation, co-ordination and non-standard models. With their powerful analysis of why markets have imploded, it is this second group which has jumped into prominence with global publics through their blogs, writings and interventions.

Their research and writing have given skeptics, contrarians, and whistleblowers new legitimacy in a world in which conformity to the economic dogma used to be so pervasive. This confirms what social theorists have always recognized: societies need a system shock when political and economic arrangements become increasingly dysfunctional and when the rules of the game are no longer perceived by the majority as fair and even-handed. It needs a clear-cut course of action and requires a political theory to challenge conformist thinking about the possibilities of economic participation and social inclusion.¹⁷

Such a theory has a necessarily pessimistic view of power. Publics have always recognized that power, if unchecked, corrupts its possessor. The relational power of publics is the power to disseminate one's ideas in ever widening political arenas. This form of power is only held vis-à-vis other activists and networks. In that particular regard, it is the most decentralized sharing of power resources. Perhaps it most closely resembles Nancy Fraser's concept of a public system of checks and balances as necessary part of the process of creating alternatives. It is a

maddeningly slow kind of political mobilization. Incremental change occurs through a thousand small victories (or defeats) by micro-activists at the local level and the periodic breakthroughs of transnational movements such as those that occurred at the iconic “battle in Seattle” or the signing of the international treaty outlawing landmines.

‘Things Public’ and the Big Debate

There are two phases to the big debate about “things public.” The first phase, which has recently come to an end, considered whether the shrinking of the public domain worldwide was constitutive of a diminishment of democratic society. In this phase, disgruntled publics, dissenting activists, and skeptical public intellectuals won the day. Dissenters are now valuable political commentators, and their contribution adds depth to political debate.¹⁸ Ten years ago the currency of skeptical high-profile economists like Dani Rodrik of Harvard and Robert Hunter Wade of the London School of Economics traded at a lower level than it does today. Elites dismissed them as pessimistic gadflies who did not understand the new world order. Today, their intellectual transgression has been reinterpreted as prescient observation. Even the new conservatism is willing to embrace the non-conformist’s impulse to interrogate received wisdom. In conversation with the philosopher Michel Onfray, Nicolas Sarkozy was eager to impress prospective French voters with his dissenter’s credibility, stating “I believe in transgression . . . because freedom is transgression.”¹⁹ Dissent has become an essential counterpoint to the mainstream discourse of law, security, markets, and private accumulation.

The second phase of the debate is still underway, it focuses on the global outcomes and possible local solutions available to democratic activists and global publics. Experts are now engaged with an in-depth analysis of the potential impacts and outcomes of the compass of dissent and the attempts by activists to “rally the public,” in Michael Warner’s apposite words.²⁰ Modern dissenters empowered by new information Web 2.0 technology

stand in sharp contrast to neo-liberal faith in the market's universalizing qualities. The radio and tv were passive mediums you watched or listened but could not talk back to. The new broadcast model is designed to push power down and empower the user by creating social networks of alternative information. Many use information technology for distraction; millions of others have used it to become micro and macro activists. It is this explosion of information-driven activism online and now offline which is the defining characteristic of our times. In Iran, the EU elections and the US elections organizing on and offline has changed the electoral landscape.

Nevertheless, no single group is in a position to control the public's agenda any longer. Economic determinism has had to surrender the middle ground in most jurisdictions. Normative ideas about economics and the role of the state have reappeared in public policy making. In virtual politics, there is no single command and control center. The battle for public opinion is intense, fluid, and unpredictable. Gradually, the market excesses of the neo-liberal system have roused global publics from the cynicism of conformity to collective engagement. Infinite varieties of public discourse have not led to the fragmentation of politics, nor has this cacophony of voices become unintelligible to the informed listener. Dissenting publics have begun to exercise their reasoning ability and the result is a tsunami of ideas and options for fixing the relationship between publics, states, and markets. Who is listening? Everybody.²¹

Infinite varieties of the public

Leaders across the globe are beginning to realize that markets can thrive in the context of uniquely public purpose. With the slow and torturous collapse of the Doha round negotiations, there will be no forward progress in global trade liberalism, at least not in the near future.²² The wave of privatizations and deregulation that defined global liberalism has crested and largely subsided. This and other events have finalized the divorce between restive publics and paternalistic experts. European

Union ministers are beginning to see the need to get the right balance between the public and private in the modern mixed economy. People need security, and competition is no longer the single imperative of economic policy. This major course correction by the largest trading bloc in the world will not change the direction of the EU overnight, but it is an unprecedented retreat for global neo-liberalism. It sends an unmistakable message to global publics that they do make a difference.

Ours are still pyramid societies, tiny at the apex and held together at the bottom by Hyekian economic discipline, control, threat, socialization, and the legal power vested in the dominant classes and the state. And yet, due to the bias of communication, there is such a tremendous amount of power being concentrated and consolidated at the bottom of the pyramid that politicians are unsure if they should champion it or work to contain the threat of instability. Text and images have always framed political activism with timeless messages of anger, defiance, and social justice. Organized publics target the public mind while working to create new kinds of knowledge about political thought, morality, art, literature, and politics. Modern insurgent publics have never played by the rules. They are intent on establishing different rules for private actors. Ultimately the future emancipatory potential of the public is found in the threads that bind together disparate activity in the global public domain. Like Camus's Rebel, the activist draws the line and takes her stand by declaring, "this far, and no farther will I be commanded." The digital connection is her lifeline and her line in the sand.

A strong and democratic public domain is fundamental to the creation of a good life. Markets are a means to an end in the service of human society, and without the collective human good to guide them, they become weapons wielded by the powerful in the service of particularistic values and avarice. The financial disasters of Enron and World.com and the military disaster in Iraq

seem to fit a common theme in the public imagination. In recent history, the system of global capitalism designed for social stability has been undermined by the greed of powerful executives and war profiteers. Of course corruption is not new to capitalism; the capitalist walks a thin line between earnings and fraud. This is the logical outcome of investors driven by the business cycle and where information is always imperfect. Citizens are perhaps not cynical about capitalism so much as they are skeptical about the claim of elites that they act in the public good. This yawning gap between economic goals and social outcomes increasingly marks global capitalism at the turn of the twenty-first century. For a half a century the Keynesian welfare state has raised public expectations about reconciling efficiency and equality.

The decline of deference of the Internet age allows anyone with a modem to challenge political authority. Activists now attack the hypocrisy of the political elites and “the bloodless moralism” of American realism. Therefore, the credo of the activist, network, and social movement is not only ‘the slave against the master, but also of man against the world of master and slave . . . Thanks to rebellion, there is something more in history than the relation between mastery and servitude.’ Unlimited power is not the only law.²³ Public spaces are being created in the most unlikely places – in the mall, on the Internet, and in the millions of chance encounters in everyday life between anonymous strangers. The circle of public life seems to get larger and more complex. Infinite varieties of the public are already imagining larger and bolder changes for the international system and the global economy. Authoritarians and paternalistic politicians are justifiably frightened of the new and sophisticated forms of defiance coming up from below. The bottom of the pyramid has always been populated by “dangerous classes,” who are not, in the minds of the elite, capable or trustworthy governors of their own destinies. But when communicative power is backed by political will, the reallocation of power downwards is not only possible, it is inevitable.

A Habermasian or Foucaultian public sphere?

The reallocation of power that comes with technological change is hardly a new phenomenon, but its dynamics are of singular importance to grasp. It is the case that power is always in flux, and its upward movement has vested vast power in the global corporation. With each crisis since the early 1980s, global capitalism has been able to extend its influence behind and beyond the nation-state. It is more invasive and its norm-setting capacity has utilized institutions like the WTO to enhance global governance to promote the corporate agenda. But its downward devolution is both a remarkable and persistent feature of modernity. Pessimists conveniently overlook that the industrial revolution brought with it a series of transformative social changes that culminated in the revolutions of 1848.

Similarly, scientific revolutions of the twentieth century, including the invention of the birth control pill, fundamentally reorganized the power dynamics of society, freeing women from patriarchal reproductive dynamics and fueling the dissent movement of 1968. System and structure had to bend to accommodate new realities as needed. Today, the digital communications revolution is also changing the social landscape, with the power to free millions of people from the marginalization that comes from having no voice in global affairs.

Marx argued that capitalism renews itself through a flushing of the system. Similarly the networked global society has begun to regulate not only markets at home but around the world. Globalization as envisaged by neo-liberal economists frees people and capital to seek greater investment returns in foreign markets. This has unleashed an unprecedented cycle of wealth creation in the last twenty years the likes of which has not been seen since the nineteenth century. With the globalization of wealth has come the globalization of poverty and inequality on all continents. The massive gulf between the richest and the poorest

and the insouciant way elites have responded fueled first worry and then anger in defiant publics. Economic historians point to the relevance of other periods of globalization to have a perspective on our own times. After massive rent taking and wealth creation of elites and financial markets, what comes next?

The period up to the 1860s, the periods before the First World War and after the Second World War each gave birth to an expansion of democratic rights at home and international law abroad. Of course the institutional weaknesses of the international order also triggered catastrophic crises. In one sense Marx was right. Periods of capitalist expansion are ultimately destructive of many things that have come before. Schumpeter astutely noted, periods of instability are also periods of great political innovation as governments and publics fight over the best way to tame globalization. The fundamental tensions in democratic society of our era are between the compromise that crafted the status quo and the risks and rewards of leveling the hierarchy of command and control present in every society.

Fate, choice and the fully realized citizen

The agency and voice facilitated by Web 2.0 power dynamics have fueled new citizenship practices. The democratization of political voice gives global publics the power to change state policy in fundamental ways. Habermas's idea was that citizens can change state policy through acts of assembly. "No one," as Habermas says so eloquently, "can be brought to apply the results of a decision if he has not participated in the discussion that led to the decision."²⁴ Before the Internet era, Habermas thought that this had to happen through face-to-face interaction. Today, digital technology has facilitated this process in a radical and decentralized way, and communities of unprecedented influence and reach are formed online.

The Washington Consensus prioritized system and structure as the key drivers of public policy; Internet, satellite communications, cellular phones, text messaging, and even radio and television have turned conventional wisdom on its head. The global cultural economy is instrumental in shaping the fully realized citizen, rooted in the local, but deeply interested in, and able to influence, global issues and events by forming active communities of choice rather than disinterested communities of fate. To be a social actor today, one needs to be patched into the worldwide digital communications network. Do-it-yourself techno-gurus, bloggers, musicians, writers, public intellectuals, social movements, counterculture activists, and even knowledge caretakers such as universities, archives, and museums contribute new ideas about what it means to be a citizen in the transnational cultural context. Benedict Anderson has argued that in the nineteenth century, print capitalism created the modern citizen and nationalism as the mainstays of the nation-state. In the twenty-first century the most novel idea is that the hypertext is recreating the modern concept of citizenship through access to new collective identities, new moral authorities in times of crisis and new ways of understanding.

Who then is going to rule the future? The bareness of liberal realism? The far Right trinity of god, family, and nation? The agential power of innovative disgruntled global publics? Global cosmo-populism? In the chaotic divorce between the economic triumphalism of elites and the activism of engaged, disgruntled global publics, what other massive transformative changes are gathering and already on the way? The times are strange; why make things up? Read the message in the bottle -- Hayeck is back in the vault and Keynes, Marx and Prebisch, iconic thinkers of the past, are again, harbingers of a new order.

Notes

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¹ OECD *Economic Outlook*, Paris June 2009.

² Martin Wolf, "After the storm comes a hard climb," *Financial Times*, July 14, 2009.

³ Robert Schiller, "To fix the economy, tell the right stories," *Globe and Mail* May 14, 2009.

⁴ Ralph Atkins, "European clouds refuse to part," *Financial Times*, May 14, 2009.

⁵ Simon Jonson, The Two –Track Economy, Aug 20, 2009

<http://baselinescenario.com/2009/08/20/the-two-track-economy/>

⁶ Nouriel Roubini, "Double-dip recession risk," *Financial Times*, August 24, 2009.

⁷ Joseph Stiglitz, "Economy to Worsen," *Presena Latina*, May 9 Lisbon, 2009.

⁸ George Akerlof and Robert Schiller, *Animal Spirits How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism*, Princeton: Princeton UP 2009.; *Financial Times*, Sept 3, 2009.

⁹ Simon Johnson, "The Nature of Modern Finance," The Baseline Scenario, August 31, 2009 http://baselinescenario.com/2009/08/20/the_nature_of_modern_finance/.

¹⁰ *The Economist*, The French model Vive la différence | BEAUVAIS AND PARIS, ! May 7th 2009, http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13610197.

¹¹ Stephan Lejbfried and Paul Pierson, "Prospects for Social Europe," *Politics and Society* 20:3 (September 1992.) 333-366.

¹² Wolfgang Streeck, "European Social Policy after Maastricht: The Social Dialogue' and 'Subsidiarity'", *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 15:2 1994 151-177.

¹³ *Economist* May 7th 2009.

¹⁴ Dani Rodrik, "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?"

http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Lessons%20of%20the%201990s%20review%20_JEL_.pdf

¹⁵ Daniel Drache, *Defiant Publics The Unprecedented Reach of the Global Citizen*, London: Polity Press 2008.

¹⁶ Dani Rodrik's Weblog, Why economists disagree?
http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2007/08/why-do-economis.html

¹⁷ Cass Sunstein, *Why Societies Need Dissent*, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003.

¹⁸ Ron Diebert, "International Plug n'Play? Citizen Activism, the Internet and Global Public Policy," *International Studies Perspectives* 11:3:255-72.

¹⁹ Michael Onfay in conversation with Nicholas Sarkozy, *Philosophie Magazine* (Spring 2007).

²⁰ Michael Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, New York: Zone Books, 2000.

²¹ The success of public intellectuals like Malcom Gladwell's *Tipping Point* New York: Little Brown 2006 is a good example of the new found interest in public debate and the rediscovery of big ideas.

²² Daniel Drache and Marc D. Froese "Omens and Threats in the Doha Round: The Decline of Multilateralism?" Working Paper Series, Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition,
<http://globalization.mcmaster.ca>, May 2008.

²³ Albert Camus, *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*, originally published 1951 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956, reprinted 1961), p. 284.

²⁴ Quoted in Bruno Latour, *The Politics of Nature* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 171.

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